Criminal Law

CJ 215
It's the law!

Instructor Introduction [e-mail]

Introducing Dr. Lin

Travel Overseas

Defenses to Criminal Liability

Text: Criminal Law 10Eby Joel Samaha
Chapter 5/Justifications
Chapter 6/ Excuse

Parties to Crime and Vicarious Liability

Text: Criminal Law 10Eby Joel Samaha
Chapter 7
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Student Post Case Brief Here

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Next Students post

Inchoate Crimes

Text: Criminal Law 10Eby Joel Samaha
Chapter 8: Attempt, Conspiracy, and Solicitation
Le Barron vs State
Citation- 145 n.w 2nd 79 Wis.
Issue-Did he voluntarily evacuate his plan to rape.
Holding-NO
Conclusion- That it was considered rape.
Principle- Beyond a Resoniable Doubt
By Chris Bailey

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Le Barron v. State
Citation= 145 N.W. 2nd 79 (WI). 1966
Issue= he voluntarily abounded his plans to rape
Holding= no
Analysis = Le Barron abounded is plans to rape he found out pregnant
Conclusion= the concluded that it was rape
Principle doctrine of law= Rape

By Fabian Guerrero

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Le Barron v. State
145 N.W.2d 79 (Wis. 1996)
I: Did he voluntarily abandon his attempt to rape?
R: 944.01 (1), Stats. Any male who has sexual intercourse with a female he knows is not his wife, by force and against her will, may be imprisoned not more than 30 years.
939.32 (2), Stats. An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime and that he does acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrated unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that he formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.
A: The court had to infer intent of his actions because, “We consider defendants over acts, which support a reasonable inference that he intended to have sexual intercourse with complaint by force and against her will, to be these:
(1) He threatened complainant that he would kill her if she refused to cooperate with him;
(2) He forced complainant into the shack and against the wall; and
(3) He stated, “You know what else I want,” unzipped his pants, and started pulling up her skirt.”
C: “We conclude that a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt from these overt acts of defendant that he intended to have sexual intercourse with defendant by force and against her will.” Affirmed.

By Matt Espinoza

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Samaha Case
Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I

Title: Duest v. State
Citation: 462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
Issue:
Convicted of first-degree murder and death was imposed, Duest appealed.
Holding: First-Degree Murder
Analysis:

Premeditated murder intent to take someones life.
Conclusion:

Affirmed the defendants conviction and the imposition of the death sentence.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Sufficient evidence, aggrivated circumstances inconsistent with reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
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By: Kaylee Marston

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Samaha Case Chapter 8 Inchoate Crimes
Title: Le Barron v. State
Citation: 145 N.W. 2d 79 (Wis. 1966)
Issue:
It is hard to factor intent apart from that of overt act!
Holding: Attempted rape
Analysis:

David Le Barron attempted to rape Jodean Randen and mug her. But he didn’t actually committee rape.
Conclusion:

Just could infer that he intended to have sexual intercourse with the defendant by force.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Beyond a reasonable inference and doubt!
By:Kaylee Marston

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Samaha Case Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
Title: People v. O’Neil
Citation: 550 N.E. 2d 1090 (Ill. App. 1990)
Issue:
Defendants both appealed and the appellate court reversed the conviction!
Holding: Involuntary manslaughter
Analysis:

Conclusion:

Defendants appealed and matters were consolidated for review!
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Actus Reaus and Mens Rea
By: Kaylee Marston

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Samaha Case Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
Brad Dible
Title: Byford v. State
Citation: 994 P. 2d 700 (Nev. 2000)
Issue:
Did the defendant Intentionally, with premeditation and deliberation kill Monica Wilkins?
Holding: Yes He killed her intentionally with premeditation and deliberation.
Analysis:

The aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances in the present case.
Conclusion:

Because of prior threats discussion about the murder and torture of the victim it is capital murder.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
First-degree murder premeditated, deliberate, intent to kill murder.
NRS 2000.033 the murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim telling the victim that he didn’t shoot her before shooting her again.

LeBarron v. State
145 N. W. 2d 79 (Wis. 1966)
by
Laura Williams

Facts
On March 3, 1965, at 6:55 pm a housewife named Jodean Randen was walking home across a well-traveled railroad bridge in Eau Claire, Wisconsin. She first had her purse stolen by a man walking the opposite direction, who then forced her to accompany him off the bridge and into a coal shack near the railroad tracks. After being informed by Mrs. Randen that she was pregnant and visually confirming this as fact, he left her alone, but threatened to kill her if she screamed or reported the attack.

Decision of Trial Court
David LeBarron was subsequently arrested for the attack on Mrs. Randen. He was convicted of atempted rape and sentenced to not more than 15 years in prison. He appealed this conviction.

Issue at Law
LeBarron argued that he had voluntarily desisted before fully forming the intention to complete the act of intercourse against Mrs. Randen's will. He also argued the existence of Mrs. Randen's pregnancy was not an intrinsic factor in causing him to stop his attack but an extraneous factor preventing its completion.

Holding
The Court rejected the defense of abandonment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the appeal of LeBarron and affirmed his conviction. Currie, J. presiding, Gordon, J., concurring.

Analysis
The Court examined LeBarron's appeal in light of the statutes he was convicted of violating, 944.01(1) and 939.32(2). The first basically states that any male who has sexual intercourse with a female he knows is not his wife by force or against her will may be imprisoned for not more than 30 years. The second holds, essentially, that an attempt requires that an actor have the intent to perform acts which would constitute a crime “except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor”. Samaha, 10ed, pg 256. The Court agreed that a jury could have reasonably inferred Mrs. Randen's pregnancy as either an intrinsic factor that caused LeBarron to abandon his attempt, or an extraneous factor which prevented its completion. However, the Court found that the elements of attempt were nonetheless sufficiently proven at trial. LeBarron had threatened to kill Mrs. Randen to gain her cooperation; he forced the her into the shack and against the wall; he stated “You know what else I want.”, lifted her skirt and lowered his zipper.

Samaha Case Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
Brad Dible
Title: Duest v. State
Citation: 462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
Issue:
Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and death penalty?
Holding: Yes The challenged aggravating circumstances showed that the crime was “heinous atrocious, or cruel”.
Analysis:

Evidence showed that the murder was premeditated and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Conclusion:

Because of statements made that he brings gay guys to his home to beat them up and rob them and he had the knife premeditation is shown. Evidence showed the victim received eleven stab wounds inflicted in the bedroom and some in the bathroom so it was considered especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
The Florida Supreme Court applied the state’s “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance provision.
In Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1982) that death caused by one or more of ten stab wounds can be found especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

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Title: Le Barron v. State
Citation: 145 N.W. 2d 79 (Wis. 1966)
Issue:

Holding: Defendant’s overt acts established that he intended to rape the victim.
Jury could find that defendant desisted from the attempted rape after he formed intent and took the overt steps and that her pregnancy was an extraneous factor leading to his renunciation.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin
Next Students post

Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
People v. Allen
64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (1997)

Court concluded that while absolute footage the distance moved may have been short, the character of moving the victim was of a character sufficient to justify jury’s finding of substantially. Movement was made to prevent victim from getting/keeping her car.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

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Chapter 8 Inchoate Crimes
By Jay Wessel
Title: Le Barron v. State
Citation: 145 N.W. 2d 79 (Wis. 1966)
Issue: Did the jury have to assume that the defendant had the requisite physical strength and weapon to carry out the crime?
Holding:Affirmed the conclusion
Analysis: Le Barron overted his act after the defendant pleaded she was pregnant
Conclusion: A jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt from these overt acts of the defendant that he intended to have sexual intercourse with the defendant by force against her will
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: The two statutory requirements of intent and overt acts which must concur in order to have attempt to rape are; the male must have intent to act, and the male must act toward the commission of the rape

Samaha Case Chapter 8 Inchoate Crimes
Brad Dible
Title: Le Barron v. State
Citation: 145 N.W. 2d 79 (Wis. 1966)
Issue:
Did the defendant have intent to rape even though he did not go through with the crime due the victim’s pregnancy being an extraneous event?
Holding: Yes the Defendant would have gone through with the crime if not stopped by the woman saying and showing she was pregnant.
Analysis:

Was her actions and the fact that she was pregnant an extraneous event.
Conclusion:

He would have done the crime if not for the extraneous event.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Voluntary abandonment
A change in the actor’s purpose not influenced by ousted circumstances, what may be termed repentance or change of heart?

Crimes Against Persons I

Brad Dible
Samaha Case Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
Title: People v. O’Neil
Citation: 550 N.E. 2d 1090 (Ill. App. 1990)
Issue:
Did The companies Film Recovery and Metallic Marketing along with the companies’ directors’ officers and high managerial personal cause the death of their employee?
Holding: A jury convicted corporate and individual officers of murder, but the Appellate Court reversed their convictions
Analysis:

Corporations and high corporate officers acting within the scope of their authority and for the benefit of a corporation can commit murder.
Conclusion:

The conviction was reversed and defendants O’Neil, Kirschbaum, and Rodriguez were responsible for operating the plant under those conditions.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
In Illinois, a corporation is criminally responsible for offenses “authorized , requested, commanded, or performed by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment A high managerial agent is defined as “an officer of the corporation, or any other agent who has a position of comparable authority for the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision of subordinate employees in a managerial capacity(Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 5-4

Byford VS State
994 P.2d 700 (Nev.-2000)
Did the Defendent show intent to kill
yes
There were extenuationg circumstances
Guilty
Was there intent to Kill
By Chris Bailey

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Byford VS State
Citation=994 P.2d 700 (Nev.-2000)
Issue= evidence sowed intent to kill Monica Wiking
Holding= yes
Analysis= the aggravating out weights matriculating circumstances
Conclusion = they affirmed tat he was guilty
Principle doctrine of law= Intent to kill
by Fabian Guerrero

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Duest V. State
Citation= 462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
Issue= convicted of murder and he appalled
Holding= yes
Analysis= Duest committed the murder
Conclusion= Duest was found guilty of 1st degree murder
Principle doctrine of law= 1st degree murder
By Fabian Guerrero

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Chapter 9: Murder and Manslaughter

Court found sufficient evidence to establish deliberation and premeditation on defendant’s part.
Distinguishes between premeditation and deliberation
Willful = intent to kill
Deliberation = process of determining upon a course of action to kill as a result of thought, including weighing the reasons for and against the actions
Premeditation = design, determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind by the time of the killing
Court found torture (aggravating circumstance) requires that murder intended to inflict pain beyond the killing itself….and that jury could find facts to support that.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin
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Byford v. State
994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000)
I: Was there sufficient evidence to show establish deliberation and premeditation?
R: NRS 200.030 (1)(a), provides in relevant part that murder perpetrated by “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” is first-degree murder.
A: Postmortem mutilation occurred here when byford set the body on fire. Therefore, the evidence in the case supports a finding of both torture and mutilation. Because byford was on probation at the time of the murder, the jury found an additional aggravating circumstance in his case, for a total of two, versus one for Williams. The evidence showed that byford fired two fatal shots into the victims head when she was completely helpless, threatened to kill smith if he told, and took the initiative in concealing the crime.
C: We conclude that byfords death sentence is not excessive and that there is no evidence it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice., or any arbitrary factor. We affirm byfords conviction and sentence of death. Affirmed.

By Matt Espinoza

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Le Barron v. State
145 N.W.2d 79 (Wis. 1996)
I: Did he voluntarily abandon his attempt to rape?
R: “944.01 (1), Stats. Any male who has sexual intercourse with a female he knows is not his wife, by force and against her will, may be imprisoned not more than 30 years.”
“939.32 (2), Stats. An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime and that he does acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrated unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that he formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.”
A: The court had to infer intent of his actions because, “We consider defendants over acts, which support a reasonable inference that he intended to have sexual intercourse with complaint by force and against her will.”
C: “We conclude that a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt from these overt acts of defendant that he intended to have sexual intercourse with defendant by force and against her will.” Affirmed.

By Bev Johnson

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Duest v. State
462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
I: Was there insufficient evidence of premeditated murder to convict him as charged in the indictment?
R: The court applied the states “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance provision. 921.141 (5)(b,d,f,h,i)
A: The evidence presented at trial shows that the victim received eleven stab wounds, some of which were inflicted in the bedroom and some inflicted in the bathroom. We find that the evidence supports the finding that the homicide was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.
C: In the instant case, even if we were to find that one or two of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge, was inapplicable, it would still be appropriate to maintain the death penalty. For the reason expressed, we affirm the defendants conviction and the imposition of the death sentence. It is so ordered.

By Matt Espinoza

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People v. O’Neil
550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill.App. 1990)
I: Did they “Murder” their employee?
R: The criminal code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch.38, apr.9-1(a)(2) defines murder as the following:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: He knows that such as acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to their individual.
A: Evidence at trial indicated Golab died after inhaling poisonous cyanide fumes while working in a plant operated by Film Recover and its sister corporation Metallic Marketing. The record contains substantial evidence regarding the nature of working conditions inside the plant. Testimony established that air inside the plant, was foul smelling and made breathing difficult and painful. Plant workers experienced dizziness, nausea, headaches, and bouts of vomiting. There is evidence that plant workers were not informed they were working with cyanide. Nor were they informed of the presence or, danger of breathing cyanide gas. Ventilation in the plant was poor. Plant workers were given neither safety instruction nor adequate protective clothing.
C: We have determined evidence in the record is not so insufficient as to bar retrial, our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence should e be in any way interpreted as a finding as to defendant’s guilt that would be binding on the court on retrial. Reversed and remanded.

By Matt Espionza

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PEOPLE V. O'NEIL
550 N.E. 2D 1090 (Ill. App. 1990)
by
Laura Williams

Facts
in 1982, Film Recovery Systems was a corporation engaged in the business of extracting silver from used X-ray and photographic film for the purpose of resale. Along with its sister corporation Metallic Marketing, Film Recovery performed the extraction by processing shredded films through a solution water and cyanide. On the morning of February 10, 1983, an employee of Film Recovery named Steven Golab was conducting his normal work duties when he became faint. He retired to a back room to rest, lost consciousness, and was later pronounced dead upon arrival at a local hospital. If was determined on autopsy that Mr. Golab had died of cyanide poisoning from inhaling cyanide fumes from the plant atmosphere.

Decision of Trial Court
A Cook County grand jury subsequently indicted Steven O'Neil, Charlie Kirschbaum, and Daniel Rodriguez, agents of Film Recovery Systems, for murder in the death of Steven Golab. The grand jury also charged Film Recovery and Metallic Marketing with involuntary manslaughter in the death of Steven Golab. After a joint bench trail, all of the defendants were convicted as charged. O'Neil, Kirschbuam, and Rodriguez were each sentenced to 25 years imprisonment for murder. Corporate defendants Film Recovery and Metallic Marketing were each fined $10,000 for involuntary manslaughter. The defendants appealed their convictions.

Issue at Law
The defendants appeal was based on the premise that two entities which must be viewed as a single entity had been convicted of two varying degrees of the same crime, indicating more than one mens rea.

Holding
The Appellate Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case back to the lower court. Lorenz, J. presiding,.

Analysis
The Court of Appeals centered its attention on the entities involved, the convictions obtained for each, and the mens rea required for each conviction. The Court noted that the crime of manslaughter requires a specific mens rea, and the crime of murder requires another. They also held that the two states of mind were mutually exclusive. The corporate defendants were convicted of manslaughter. Since they were not real people, their “state of mind” must be attributed to their “high officers”. In this case, that state of mind was attributed to the human defendants, who had already been convicted of murder. Essentially, it was not possible for both states of mind to exist in the self-same defendant for the same crime.

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DUEST V. STATE
462 So. 2D 446 (Fla.1985)
by
Laura Williams

Facts:
The defendant, Lloyd Duest, had announced to acquaintances that on the night of February, 1982, he was going to “roll a fag”. He was seen earlier the same day carrying a seven-inch knife in the waistband of his pants. He later went to a gay bar where he was seen with the victim, John Pope, and they were seen together in the victim's gold Camaro. Pope was discovered stabbed to death in his home. His car and jewelry chest were discovered in the possession of the defendant.

Trial Court Decision:
Duest was convicted of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court, Broward County, Patricia W. Cocalis, J., and sentenced to death. Duest appealed his conviction.

Issue at Law:
Duest attacked the characterization of the crime as “heinous, atrocious, and cruel”. He also argued that exculpatory testimony had been withheld by the prosecution, and that he had received insufficient assistance of counsel. He argued that a witness for the prosecution had changed his initial testimony. .

Holding:
The Supreme Court affired the trial court's denial of Duest's motion for post-conviction relief. Quince, C.J., and Wells, Pariente, Lewis, Canady, and Polston, JJ., concur. Labarga, J., did not participate.

Analyis:
The evidence presented at trial showed the victim received some eleven stab wounds, inflicted in two different locations within the house. (Morgan v State, 415 So. 2D 6 (Fla 1982)) The victim also may have lived some minutes before dying of blood loss, making the crime especially cruel. The Court found no exculpatory value in the changed testimony, and that Duest's counsel had performed adequately in impeaching the questionable testimony.

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Duest v. State
462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)

Facts of case were sufficient to find that defendant engaged in atrocious heinous and cruel murder
–Multiple stab wounds
–Statements that he intended to roll gay guys
–Stole victim’s jewelry
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

People v. O’Neil
550 N.E. 2d 1090 (Ill. App. 1990)

Court overturned appellate court’s decision ruling that corporate officers could not be guilty of involuntary murder. The supreme court looked at the actions of the officer’s and determined that the officers were responsible for running the plant the way they did, they knew of the dangers to their employees.
“A corporation is criminally responsible whenever any of its high managerial agents possess the requisite mental state and is responsible for a criminal offense while acting within the scope of his employment.”
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

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Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
Hamilton v. Cameron
700 N. E. 2d 336 (Ohio App. 3d 1997)

Because victim recanted her statement and testified that she was not threatened and did not believe she was in imminent harm, the court found there was insufficient evidence to prove state of mind of victim and other essential elements of the crime. There was no other evidence from which this could be inferred.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

BYFORD V. STATE
994 P. 2d 700 (Nev 2000)
by
Laura Williams

Facts:
Robert Byford and a co-defendant lured the victim, Monica Wilkins to a remote location. Byford brought a handgun, and his co-defendant used it to shoot the victim multiple times. Byford delivered the final two shots himself. Byford then set the body on fire to attempt to conceal the crime. Both defendants later returned to the scene and attempted to further conceal the remains.

Trial Court Decision:
Both defendants were convicted in the Eighth Judicial District Court of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Both were sentenced to death. Both appealed, The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for retrial. On remand, they were both again convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and Byford was again sentenced to death. He appealed.

Issue at Law:
Byford's appeal attempted to show that the first-degree burden of proof had not been met. He also attacked his death sentence as inappropriate, as his co-defendant had fired more shots and received a “lighter” sentence on remand of life imprisonment. (see Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783-84 (1990), Conklin v. State, 331 S.E.2d 532, 539 (Ga. 1985), Flanagan v. State, 105 Nev. 135, 141, 771 P.2d 588, 592 (1989), Cavanaugh v. State, 102 Nev. 478, 487, 729 P.2d 481, 486 (1986), et al)

Holding:
The Supreme Court affirmed the previous conviction and sentencing.

Analysis:
The Court found that the necessary burden of proof had been met to prove the murder took place with “deliberation, intent, and premeditation”. They additionally found that the death sentence was appropriate, as Byford had more aggravating and fewer mitigating circumstances than his co-defendant.

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People v. O’Neil
550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill.App. 1990)
I: Did they “Murder” their employee?
R: The criminal code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch.38, apr.9-1(a)(2) defines murder as the following:
“A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: He knows that such as acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to their individual.”
A:” Evidence at trial indicated Golab died after inhaling poisonous cyanide fumes while working in a plant operated by Film Recover and its sister corporation Metallic Marketing. The record contains substantial evidence regarding the nature of working conditions inside the plant. Testimony established that air inside the plant, was foul smelling and made breathing difficult and painful. Plant workers experienced dizziness, nausea, headaches, and bouts of vomiting. There is evidence that plant workers were not informed they were working with cyanide. Nor were they informed of the presence or, danger of breathing cyanide gas. Ventilation in the plant was poor. Plant workers were given neither safety instruction nor adequate protective clothing.”
C:” We have determined evidence in the record is not so insufficient as to bar retrial, our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence should e be in any way interpreted as a finding as to defendant’s guilt that would be binding on the court on retrial. Reversed and remanded.”

By Bev Johnson

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Duest v. State
462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
I: Was there insufficient evidence of premeditated murder to convict him as charged in the indictment?
R: The court applied the states “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance provision. 921.141 (5)(b,d,f,h,i)
A: “The evidence presented at trial shows that the victim received eleven stab wounds, some of which were inflicted in the bedroom and some inflicted in the bathroom. We find that the evidence supports the finding that the homicide was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.”
C: “Even if we were to find that one or two of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge, was inapplicable, it would still be appropriate to maintain the death penalty. For the reason expressed, we affirm the defendants conviction and the imposition of the death sentence. It is so ordered.”

By Bev Johnson

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Byford v. State
994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000)
I: Was there sufficient evidence to show establish deliberation and premeditation?
R: “NRS 200.030 (1)(a), provides in relevant part that murder perpetrated by “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” is first-degree murder.”
A: Therefore, the evidence in the case supports a finding of both torture and mutilation. Because byford was on probation at the time of the murder, the jury found an additional aggravating circumstance in his case, for a total of two, versus one for Williams. The evidence showed that byford fired two fatal shots into the victims head when she was completely helpless, threatened to kill smith if he told, and took the initiative in concealing the crime.
C: We conclude that byfords death sentence is not excessive and that there is no evidence it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice., or any arbitrary factor. We affirm byfords conviction and sentence of death. Affirmed.

By Bev Johnson

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Samaha Case Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
Title: Byford v. State
Citation: 994 P. 2d 700 (Nev. 2000)
Issue:
They were sentenced to death, they appealed sentence and court reversed and demanded for retrail.
Holding: First-Degree murder
Analysis:

They both committed aggrivated murder. They both confessed to people that they committed the crime!
Conclusion:

Byford was sentenced to death and Williams was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Beyond a reasonable doubt!
By:Kaylee Martson

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Next Students post

Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
State v. Curley
939 P.2d 1103 (N.M. App., 1997)

Although we have cases saying that even slight amount of force… Is sufficient, we also have cases in which a taking of property from the person of a victim has not been held to be robbery
Adhered to majority rule
Robbery is committed when attached property is snatched or grabbed by sufficient force so as to overcome the resistance of attachment.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

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Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
By Jay Wessel
Title: Byford v. State
Citation: 994 P. 2d 700 (Nev. 2000)
Issue: Was all three elements met to establish first degree murder?
Holding: Affirmed by Supreme Court
Analysis: Byford and Williams charged with first degree murder with a deadly weapon. Byford was sentenced to death , Williams got off with a lesser sentence than death
Conclusion: Byford’s death sentence is not excessive and that there is no evidence it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factory. We affirmed Byford
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: NRS 200.033 (8)- Provides as an aggravating circumstance that “the murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim”

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Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
By Jay Wessel
Title: Duest v. State
Citation: 462 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1985)
Issue: Was there sufficient evidence to prove premeditated murder?
Holding: Affirmed
Analysis: Duest was convicted of first degree murder with the imposition of the death penalty
Conclusion: One or two the aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge, was in applicable, it would still be appropriate to maintain the death penalty
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: Defendant had been previously convicted of armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery. The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.

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Chapter 9 Crimes Against Persons I
By Jay Wessel
Title: People v. O’Neil
Citation: 550 N.E. 2d 1090 (Ill. App. 1990)
Issue: Is it the managers fault because they didn’t warn their employees of the toxins? Should the co-workers have known something was wrong?
Holding: Reversed and Remanded
Analysis: Determined evidence in the record is not so insufficient as to bar retrial. The court’s decision was reversed and remanded
Conclusion: Finally, testimony established that defendants O’Neil, Kirschbaum, and Rodriguez we’re responsible for operating the plant under those conditions
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: Involuntary manslaughter-a person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justifications
Reckless conduct- a person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any means

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Crimes Against Persons II

Chapter 10: Criminal Sexual Conduct, Bodily Injury, and Personal Restraint

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Hamilton vs Cameron
700 N. E. 2d 336
Appealed 50 dollar fine
Domestic Voilence
Verbally threatened wife
Judgment was reversed
By Chris Bailey

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Commonwealth v. Berkowitz
609 A.2d 1338 (Pa.Sup. 1992)
641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994)
I: Was the “forcible compulsion” requirement under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 met?
R: 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121—Degree of physical force, threat of physical force, or psychological coercion.
A: The complainants testimony simply fails to establish that the Appellee forcibly compelled her to engage in sexual intercourse as required under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121. Then, in the victims words, “He put me down on the bed. It was kind of like—he didn’t throw me on the bed. It’s hard to explain. It was kind of like a push but no…” She did not bounce off the bed.”It wasn’t slow like romantic kind of thing, but it wasn’t a fast shove either. It was kind of in the middle.”
C: Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court did not err in reversing the Appellee’s conviction of rape. Accordingly, the order of the superior court reversing the rape conviction is affirmed.

By Matt Espinoza

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Hamilton v. Cameron
a700 N.E. 2d 336 (Ohio App.3d 1997)
I: Did the court error, in finding the defendant guilty?
R: R.C.2919.25 (A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.
(B) No person shall recklessly cause seriously physical harm to a family or household member.
(C) No person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household member.
A: Under the facts of this case, we find no violation of R.C. 2919.25 (C). The record shows that Darlene did not call the police and that she remained in the house. Further, when the police arrived, Darlene was watching the six-year-old play Nintendo, and the twelve-year-old was with the appellant. The only evidence presented is that appellant uttered a statement which could at best be described as a conditional threat, and that the means to carry out the threat were available to appellant. No evidence was presented that appellant ever made a motion toward a shotgun, or that he took no other action or made any other statement in furtherance of the threat which would cause the victim to believe that she would suffer imminent physical harm. The victim in fact stated that she did not believe the threat.
C: Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. All fines paid and/or property confiscated is to be returned to appellant. Judgment is entered for appellant. Judgment Reversed.

By Matt Espinoza

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Samaha Case Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
Title: Hamilton v. Cameron
Citation: 700 N. E. 2d 336 (Ohio App. 3d 1997)
Issue:
Appealed a $50 fine and confiscated shotguns
Holding: Domestic Violence
Analysis:

Mr. Cameron verbally threatened his wife but didn’t act on it and his wife wasn’t scared nor worried!
Conclusion:

Judgement was reversed paid and or property confiscated was returned to appellate
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Factual cause and legal cause!
By: Kaylee Marston

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Samaha Case Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
Title: People v. Allen
Citation: 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (1997)
Issue:
Case was appealed!
Holding: Kidnapping of a minor
Analysis:

Motor vehicle theft with no intent to kidnap.
Conclusion:

Was reversed for lack of evidentiary support of simple kidnapping.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Substantial movement
By: Kaylee Marston

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People v. Allen
64 Cal. Rptr.2d 497 (1997)
I: Is the minimum for asportation met under legal law?
R: CALJIC No. 9.52 which sets forth the elements of kidnapping of a person under 14 years of age.
A: “Allen is correct that under most cases decided pre 1981 which have examined only the actual distance involved, the movement here would not meet the legal test of substantiality.” “In so holding, we conclude that while in absolute footage the distance moved here may have been empirically short, it was in the character sufficient to justify a finding of “Substantiality” by the jury.” The California Supreme Court ruled that its not the number of feet the carjacker moved the victims but the “quality and character” of his movement that matters in asportation.
C: We confirm these factors, coupled with the distance traveled, are sufficient to satisfy the “substantial movement” requirement for the crime of simple kidnapping. Affirmed.

By Matt Espinoza

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HAMILTON V. CAMERON
700 N. E. 2d 336 (Ohio App. People v. Allen
64 Cal. Rptr.2d 497 (1997)
I: Is the minimum for asportation met under legal law?
R: CALJIC No. 9.52 which sets forth the elements of kidnapping of a person under 14 years of age.
A: “Allen is correct that under most cases decided pre 1981 which have examined only the actual distance involved, the movement here would not meet the legal test of substantiality.” “In so holding, we conclude that while in absolute footage the distance moved here may have been empirically short, it was in the character sufficient to justify a finding of “Substantiality” by the jury.” The California Supreme Court ruled that its not the number of feet the carjacker moved the victims but the “quality and character” of his movement that matters in asportation.
C: We confirm these factors, coupled with the distance traveled, are sufficient to satisfy the “substantial movement” requirement for the crime of simple kidnapping. Affirmed.
3D 1997)
by
Laura Williams

Facts:
On February 22, 1996, defendant Bobby J. Cameron had an argument with his wife. At trial, testimony was offered by his spouse, Darlene Cameron, that she had initiated a discussion about their 12-year-old son in which Mr. Cameron indicated he did not wish to participate. Mrs. Cameron continued, by her own admission, to press the issue, and Mr. Cameron admits he made the declaration “I'd probably have to blow your head off to get you to shut up.” Mrs. Cameron subsequently retired to a bedroom, still upset, to call her mother and tell her abou the argument. When Mrs. Cameron hung up, her mother called Mrs. Cameron's sister. When they rang off, Mrs. Cameron's sister called the police and reported that Mr. Cameron had threatened to shoot Mrs. Cameron. The police responded to the Cameron's residence. Upon arrival, they found Mr. Cameron and his 12-year-old son in the living room working on a computer and Mrs. Cameron watching their six-year-old son play Nintendo in a back bedroom. However, there were two loaded shotguns on the premises. They took Mr. Cameron into custody.

Decision of Trial Court
Mrs. Cameron signed a complaint. Mr. Cameron was charged with and convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25. He was fined and his weapons confiscated.

Issue at Law
Mr. Cameron claimed on appeal that an essential element of the crime of domestic violence was lacking in his conviction. Mrs. Cameron had testified at trial that she did not read the statement she signed. It stated that her husband had threatened to shoot her. She stated that she only signed it because she was tired and wanted to go home. She testified that she was not in fear for her life and that her husband made no move toward the gun in the rack. Evidence was also presented that there was no prior record of Mr. Cameron threatening or actually perpetrating harm to his wife.

Holding
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. They ordered all fines paid by the appellant and property confiscated from him be returned. Walsh, C.J.. Young, P.J., concurs.Powell, J., dissents.

Analysis
The Court considered the statute Mr. Cameron was accused of violating, R.C. 2919.25. They sought to determine if any court could have found the the essential elements of the crime proven beyond any reasonable doubt (State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492, 503). The statute stated “The elements of the crime of domestic violence (R.C. 2919.25[A] ) are that a charged defendant must have knowingly caused, or attempted to cause, physical harm to a family or household member.” In light of the evidence presented, the Court did not believe that the necessary elements had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Samaha Case Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
Brad Dible
Title: Hamilton v. Cameron
Citation: 700 N. E. 2d 336 (Ohio App. 3d 1997)
Issue:
Was the trial courts guilty verdict able to prove elements of domestic violence
Holding: No The statement “I’d probably have to blow your head off to get you to shut up.” Only does not prove the elements of domestic violence
Analysis:

The wife did not call the cops or leave and there was not a dispute when the officers arrived showing that she did not believe that she was in imminent physical harm
Conclusion:

The judgment of the trial court was reversed. All fines paid and/or property confiscated is to be returned to appellant Judgment is entered for appellant.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
R.C. 2919.25.
A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member
B) No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to a family or household member
C) No person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household member

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Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
Jewell v. State
672 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. App. 1996)

The burglary statute’s requirement that the dwelling be that “of another person” was satisfied by evidence that Jewell’s entry was unlawful. Although Jewell may have had some property interest in the marital property, he nevertheless burglarized his own home when he entered to commit crimes against his estranged wife and her boyfriend.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

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Chapter 12 Crimes Against Public Order and Morals
Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco
846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994)

Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary relief and must be granted sparingly
Injunctions requested (by the homeless to stop enforcement of the Matrix program) can’t be granted because they lack the necessary specificity to be enforceable and the plaintiffs haven’t established the probability of success on the merits (if they were to sue)
–Aren’t able to show denial of equal protection and that the intent of the government is to discriminate and haven’t been able to show that police violated due process in implementing the law.
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin

PEOPLE V. ALLEN
64 Cal. Rptr. 2D 497 (1997)
by
Laura Williams

Facts
On the morning of August 7, 1995, May SunYoung left car running briefly in the driveway with her 7-year-old daughter inside while she went to manually close the garage door. Tyrone Allen entered her running car, locked the doors to prevent her re-entry, and backed out of the driveway to the opposite side of the street, with Ms. SunYoung reaching through the driver's window the entire time. Allen left the car and the area with Ms. SunYoung's purse.

Decision of Trial Court
Tyrone Allen was later apprehended by the San Francisco police. Among other charges, he was convicted of kidnapping a person under the age of 14 in the Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco. He appealed that conviction.

Issue at Law
Allen based his appeal on the issue of distance in the statute. He argued that the 30-50 feet covered by Ms. SunYoung's car with Kirstie inside was not “substantial”, and the statutory distance requirement for asportation had not been met.

Holding
The Court decided that the statutory requirement of “substantiality” had been met, so a kidnapping had in fact occurred. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court conviction. Ruvolo, J., presiding, Kline, J., dissenting.

Analysis
The jury at trial was instructed at trial according to CALJIC. No. 9.52, which states “Every person who unlawfully and with physical force or by any means of instilling fear moves any other person under 14 years of age without her consent for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial, is guilty of the crime of kidnapping….”(Pen. , subsec 208, subd (b)). The Court partially agreed. Prior to 1981, most cases examined only the actual distance involved. After that time, however, the cases were examined on the issue not only of amount of distance covered, but on the amount of danger of harm in which the victim was placed while covering the distance involved. Based on this evaluation, it is clear that Kirstie was in a great deal more danger backing across a busy street than in her family's driveway.

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People v. Allen
64 Cal. Rptr.2d 497 (1997)
I: Is the minimum for asportation met under legal law?
R: “CALJIC No. 9.52 which sets forth the elements of kidnapping of a person under 14 years of age.”
A: “Allen is correct that under most cases decided pre 1981 which have examined only the actual distance involved, the movement here would not meet the legal test of substantiality.” “In so holding, we conclude that while in absolute footage the distance moved here may have been empirically short, it was in the character sufficient to justify a finding of “Substantiality” by the jury.” The California Supreme Court ruled that its not the number of feet the carjacker moved the victims but the “quality and character” of his movement that matters in asportation.
C: “We confirm these factors, coupled with the distance traveled, are sufficient to satisfy the “substantial movement” requirement for the crime of simple kidnapping. Affirmed.”

By Bev Johnson

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Hamilton v. Cameron
700 N.E. 2d 336 (Ohio App.3d 1997)
I: Did the court error, in finding the defendant guilty?
R:” R.C.2919.25 (A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.
(B) No person shall recklessly cause seriously physical harm to a family or household member.
(C) No person, by threat of force, shall knowingly cause a family or household member to believe that the offender will cause imminent physical harm to the family or household member.”
A: “Under the facts of this case, we find no violation of R.C. 2919.25 (C). The record shows that Darlene did not call the police and that she remained in the house. Further, when the police arrived, Darlene was watching the six-year-old play Nintendo, and the twelve-year-old was with the appellant. The only evidence presented is that appellant uttered a statement which could at best be described as a conditional threat, and that the means to carry out the threat were available to appellant. No evidence was presented that appellant ever made a motion toward a shotgun, or that he took no other action or made any other statement in furtherance of the threat which would cause the victim to believe that she would suffer imminent physical harm. The victim in fact stated that she did not believe the threat.”
C: “The judgment of the trial court is reversed. All fines paid and/or property confiscated is to be returned to appellant. Judgment is entered for appellant. Judgment Reversed.”

By Bev Johnson

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Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
By Jay Wessel
Title: Hamilton v. Cameron
Citation: 700 N. E. 2d 336 (Ohio App. 3d 1997)
Issue: Was there intent behind the threat?
Holding: Reversed
Analysis: Cameron was founded guilty and made to pay a fine along with all property confiscated is to be returned to Cameron.
Conclusion: Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. All fines paid and/or property confiscated is to be returned to appellant.
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: R.C. 2919.25(A)(B)
(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or house hold member.
(B)No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to family or house hold member

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Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
By Jay Wessel
Title: People v. Allen
Citation: 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (1997)
Issue: Was the substantial distance met, ruling it to be kidnapping?
Holding: Affirmed
Analysis: Allen kidnapped Kristie and after crashing in to the curb 50ft away he then took off on foot with SunYoung’s purse.
Conclusion: While in absolute footage the distance moved here may have been empirically short, it was of character sufficient to justify a finding of “substantiality” by the jury.
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: CALJIC No. 9.52 which sets forth the elements of kidnapping a person under 14 years of age. Every person who is unlawfully with physical force

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Next Students post

Crimes Against Property

Chapter 11

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State vs Curley
939 p.2d 1103
Robbery/Larceny
No
Was intoxicated and and stole property
Descion was reversed and remanded for trail
By Chris Bailey

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State V. Curley
Citation= 939 P.2d 1103 (N.M App.. 1997)
Issue= is it robbery or larceny do to no ac of force
Holding= No
Analysis= Curley stole a women’s purse but was drunk at the time.
Conclusion= the defendants conviction is reversed
Principle doctrine of law= Robbery statute in New Mexico
by Fabian Guerrero

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Jewell V. State
Citation= 672 N.E. 2d 417 (In. App. 1996)
Issue= did he burglarize his own home
Holding= Yes
Analysis= She purchased the house in her own name before they were married
Conclusion= they affirmed that he was guilty
Principle doctrine of law= breaking and entering

by Fabian Guerrero

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State v. Curley
939 P.2d 1103 (N.M.App., 1997)
I: Is it robbery or larceny?
R: Robbery—NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1994): Theft by the use or threatened use of force or violence.
A: The jury could have found that the defendant intended to snatch the purse without contacting the victim and that the contact (the shove) was not necessary to, or even a part of, the force that separated the victim from the her purse.
C: Therefore, the trial court should have given defendants tendered larceny instructions. Defendants conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

By Matt Espinoza

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Samaha Case Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
Title: State v. Curley
Citation: 939 P.2d 1103 (N.M. App., 1997)
Issue:
Case was appealed of charges
Holding: robbery
Analysis:

The defendant stole a womens purse but claimed to be intoxicated!
Conclusion:

Defendants conviction was reversed amd remanded for a new trial.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Beyond a reasonable doubt.
By: Kaylee Marston

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Jewell v. State
672 N.E. 2d 417 (Ind.App. 1996)
I: Did he burglarize his own home?
R: Burglary, a person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary.
A: Bridget had purchased the house in her own name before the marriage. When she and jewell experienced martial difficulties, jewell moved out and bridget changed the locks to prevent jewell from re entering the house. Brigdet alone controlled access to the house. Jewell entered the house at 4:00 am through the kitchen window after having removed the screen.
C: The evidence supports the conclusion that the entry was unauthorized; and, therefore we find no error. Judgment Affirmed.

By Matt Espinoza

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Samaha Case Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
Title: Jewell v. State
Citation: 672 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. App. 1996)
Issue:
Appealed a sentence of 48 years.
Holding: Burglary with a deadly weapon.
Analysis:

Conclusion:

The courts affirmed because there were no errors found.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Intent and beyond a reasonable doubt.
By:Kaylee Marston

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State v. Curley
939 P. 2d 1103 (N.M. App., 1997)
by
Laura Williams

Facts
As the victim left a shopping mall with her daughter, Erwin Curley snatched her purse. The victim testified she was shoved or pushed towards her daughter. She testified the defendant then “just grabbed the strap of my purse and continued to run.” Defendant testified he was drunk at the time.

Trial Court Decision
Curley was convicted of roberry in the District Court, McKinkley County. Defendant appealed.

Issue at Law
The defendant asserted that the jury in his trial had not been instructed regarding the lesser charge of larceny. He attacked the evidence that enough force was used during the theft to raise it from the level of larceny to robbery (NMSA 1978, subsec 30-16-2)

Holding
The Court of Appeals, Pickard, J., held that the defendant was entitled to jury instruction on the lesser included offense of larceny. Deceision reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Analysis
The Court found that it would have been possible for a jury to reasonably infer that there was not enough force present to consider this theft a “robbery”. A jury could have seen any contact between the defendant and the victim as incidental to the defendant's inebriated state at the time. Larceny, a lesser offense involving no use of force, was included in the charges against Mr. Curley, but the jury was given no instructions about considering that charge.

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JEWELL V. STATE
672 N. E. 2d 417 (Ind. App 1996)
by
Laura Williams

Facts
Bridget Fisher bought a house in her maiden name in 1989. She and the defendant, Barry I. Jewell, lived together in the house off and on both before and after their subsequent marriage in 1990. After they separated, Ms. Fisher resumed a romantic relationship with her former boyfriend, Chris Jones. In June of 1991 Jewell broke into the home, hit Jones over the head with a two-by-four board till he was unconscious, amputated his penis and fed it to the dog.

Decision of Trial Court
Jewell was subsequently convicted of burglary with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, a class A felony, and battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a class C felony. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 48 years in prison. After retrial, Jewell appealed.

Issue at Law
The basis of Jewell's appeal was that he was improperly convicted of breaking into his own home.

Holding
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court and upheld Jewell's conviction. Dickson, Justice; Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan and Boehm, J.J., concurring. Rucker, J. concurred in result.

Analysis
That statute he was convicted of violating, Ind. Code 354321, states “A person who breaks or enters the structure of building of another person, with the intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary”. The Court examined the sufficiency of the evidence to prove Jewell had violated this statute. They determined that the burglary statute's requirement that the building be that “of another person” was satisfied because the evidence demonstrated that the entry was unauthorized. Bridget had purchased the house in her maiden name before the marriage, When she and Jewell separated, she had changed the locks to prevent his re-entry to the premises. Bridget alone controlled access to the home, and Jewell had entered it at 4:00 am through a kitchen window after removing the screen.

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Commonwealth v. Mitchell
WL 773785 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1993)
I: Is there sufficient evidence under the statute to convict?
R: 18 Pa. C.S. § 3304 Criminal Mischief
(A) Offense Defined – A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he:
(1) Damages the tangible property of another intentionally, recklessly, or by negligence in the employment of fire, explosives, or other dangerous means listed in section 3302 (a) of this title (relating to causing or risking catastrophe);
(2) Intentionally or recklessly tampers with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property; or
(3) Intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer pecuniary loss by deception or threat.
A: The intentional spray painting of graffiti on the walls of a building is factually sufficient to support a conviction for criminal mischief. The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally damaged the tangible property of the Johnsons.
C: The Superior Court affirmed Duane Mitchelle’s conviction for criminal mischief.

By Bev Johnson

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Jewell v. State
672 N.E. 2d 417 (Ind.App. 1996)
I: Did he burglarize his own home?
R: Burglary: “a person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary.”
A: Bridget had purchased the house in her own name before the marriage. When she and jewell experienced martial difficulties, jewell moved out and bridget changed the locks to prevent jewell from re entering the house. Brigdet alone controlled access to the house. Jewell entered the house at 4:00 am through the kitchen window after having removed the screen.
C: The evidence supports the conclusion that the entry was unauthorized; and, therefore we find no error. Judgment Affirmed.

By Bev Johnson

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Samaha Case Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
Brad Dible
Title: State v. Curley
Citation: 939 P.2d 1103 (N.M. App., 1997)
Issue:
What force suffices to turn a larceny into a robbery? Should the trial court have given the defendant’s tendered larceny instructions.
Holding: Yes, the conviction was reversed. The Defendant used only such force as was necessary to remove the purse from a person who was not resisting. Under this view of the facts, Defendant took the purse by surprise from a person who was not resisting, and not by force necessary to overcome any resistance.
Analysis:

The defendant toke the purse and ran. The victim did not resist and only enough force was used to take the purse. The “push” involved may not have been intentional along with the crime because the man was drunk. A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction when there is some evidence to support it.
Conclusion:

The New Mexico Court of Appeals found that the defendant used only such force as was necessary to remove the purse from a person who was not resisting, and not by force necessary to overcome any resistance. Defendant’s conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
When property is attached to the person or clothing of a victim so as to cause resistance, any taking is a robbery, not larceny, because the lever that causes the victim to part with the property is the force that is applied to break that resistance; however, when no more force is used than would be necessary to remove property from a person who does not resist, then the offense is larceny, and not robbery.

State__ v. Curley
939 P.2d 1103 (N.M.App., 1997)
I: Is it robbery or larceny?
R: Robbery—“NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1994): Theft by the use or threatened use of force or violence.”
A: “The jury could have found that the defendant intended to snatch the purse without contacting the victim and that the contact was not necessary to, or even a part of, the force that separated the victim from the her purse.”
C: Therefore, the trial court should have given defendants tendered larceny instructions. Defendants conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

By Bev Johnson
___

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Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
By Jay Wessel
Title: State v. Curley
Citation: 939 P.2d 1103 (N.M. App., 1997)
Issue: What forces suffices to turn a larceny into a robbery? Is there any view of the evidence pursuant to which that force was not shown?
Holding: Conviction is reversed and remanded for new trial
Analysis: Curley whom claimed to be drunk, snatched the purse off a young lady. Court claimed that the “shove” was not enough to be considered robbery
Conclusion: Defended used only such force as was necessary to remove the purse from the person who was not resisting. Therefore, the trial court should have given defendants tendered larceny instructions.
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: Robbery consist of hurting or threatening to hurt right now if they don’t give up their property

Samaha Case Chapter 10 Crimes Against Persons II
Brad Dible
Title: People v. Allen
Citation: 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (1997)
Issue:
Was driving 40 feet with the child in the back seat kidnapping of a person under the age of 14 was it a substantial distance
Holding: Affirmed the conviction. The distance was short but it was of a character sufficient to justify finding of substantiality by the jury.
Analysis:

Substantiality implies something more than only measured distance. While “slight” is consistent with a quantitative analysis, the term “trivial” is a qualitative term suggestive of the conclusion that more is envisioned in determining whether a kidnapping occurs than simply how far the victim is moved. The legal requirement for aspiration is satisfied by a finding of either.
Conclusion:

The court affirmed the decision with one dissent Kline, J.
Movement as short distance as shown here 30 to 40 feet- has never been held to satisfy the aspiration requirement of kidnapping. Indeed, considerably greater distances have often been held insufficient. As the majority opinion points out, movement of 90 feet, nearly three times the distance the victim in this case was moved, was held insufficient. The shortest distance this court has ever held to be “substantial” for this purpose was a full city block.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Simple kidnapping CALJIC No. 9.52 elements
Every person who unlawfully and with physical force or by any other means of instilling fear moves any other person under 14 years of age without her consent for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial, is guilty of the crime of kidnapping… ( Pen. Code, 208, subd. (b) all further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.)

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Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
By Jay Wessel
Title: Jewell v. State
Citation: 672 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. App. 1996)
Issue: Was the sufficiency of evidence met supporting Jewell’s conviction of burglary?
Holding: Judgment affirmed
Analysis: Jewell was convicted of burglary with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, a class A felony, and battery resulting in serious bodily injury a class C felony
Conclusion: The entry was unauthorized and therefore we find no error
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: Burglary statutes requirement that the dwelling be that “of another person” is satisfied if the evidence demonstrates that the entry was unauthorized

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Samaha Case Chapter 11 Crimes Against Property
Title: Jewell v. State
Citation: 672 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. App. 1996)
Issue:
Can someone burglarize their own home? Did Jewell break into his home?
Holding: The evidence supports the conclusion that the entry was unauthorized; and, therefore, we find no error. Judgment AFFIRMED.
Analysis:

The burglary statute’s requirement that the dwelling be that “of another person” is satisfied if the evidence demonstrates that the entry was unauthorized. After marital difficulties, Jewell moved out and Bridget changed the locks to prevent Jewell from reentering the house. Bridget alone controlled access to the house. Jewell entered the house at 4:00 a.m. through the kitchen window after having removed the screen.
Conclusion:

Since Jewell no longer had access to the house it was a dwelling of another person.
The evidence supports the conclusion that the entry was unauthorized; and, therefore, we find no error. Judgment AFFIRMED
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Modern law has expanded the common law definition to include your own property; now, for example, landlords can burglarize their tenants’ apartments.
By Brad Dible

Next Students post

Crimes Against Public Order and Morals

Chapter 12
_

Joyce vs City and County Of San Fransico
846 F. Supp 843
Granting peliminary indjuction
Would take all courts power to grant
The injudction was denied
By Chris Bailey

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Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco
846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D.Cal. 1994)
I: Whether to grant a preliminary injunction or not?
R: Injunction: “Such relief constitutes an extraordinary use of the courts powers and is to be granted sparingly and with the ultimate aim of preserving the status quo pending trial on the merits.”
A: The proposed injunction lacks the necessary specificity to be enforceable, and would give rise to enforcement problems sufficiently inherent as to be incurable by modification of the proposal. Those legal theories upon which plaintiffs rely are not plainly applicable to the grievances sought to be vindicated, with the effect that the Court cannot find at this time that, upon conducting the required balance of probability of success on the merits to warrant injunctive relief.
C: “The injunction sought by plaintiffs at this juncture of the litigation must be denied for two independent reasons. First, the proposed injunction lacks the necessary specificity to be enforceable, and would give rise to enforcement problems sufficently inherent as to be incurable by modification of the proposal. Second, those legal theories upon which plaintiffs rely are not plainly applicable to the grievances souht to be vindicated, with the effect that the Court cannot find at this time tht, upon conducting the required balance of harm and merit, plaintiffs have established a sufficient probabilty of success on the merits to warrant injunctive relief.”

By Bev Johnson

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Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco
846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D.Cal. 1994)
I: Whether to grant a preliminary injunction or not?
R: Injunction: Such relief constitutes an extraordinary use of the courts powers and is to be granted sparingly and with the ultimate aim of preserving the status quo pending trial on the merits.
A: The proposed injunction lacks the necessary specificity to be enforceable, and would give rise to enforcement problems sufficiently inherent as to be incurable by modification of the proposal. Those legal theories upon which plaintiffs rely are not plainly applicable to the grievances sought to be vindicated, with the effect that the Court cannot find at this time that, upon conducting the required balance of probability of success on the merits to warrant injunctive relief.
C: The injunction sought by plaintiffs at this juncture of the litigation must be denied.

By Matt Espinoza

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JOYCE V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
846 F. Supp. 843 (N. D. Cal. 1994)
by
Laura Williams

Facts
In April 1992, a report was issued by the San Francisco Mayor's Office of Economic Planning and Development. It attributed to homelessness a $173 million drain on sales in the City. In August of 1993, the City announced commencement of the Matrix program, described as “initiated to address citizen complaints about a broad range of offenses occurring on the streets and in parks and neighborhoods.” A memorandum issued to the Police Department's Southern Station Personnel directed the stringent enforcement of 18 specified code sections prohibiting trespassing, public inebriation, urinating or defecating in public, removal and possession of shopping carts, solicitation on or near a highway, erections of tents or structures in parks, obstruction, and aggressive panhandling.

Arguments
The law was seen as being unfairly targeted at the homeless population of San Francisco. Bobby Joe Joyce, Timothy E. Smith, Thomas O'Halloran, and Jim Tullah, homeless persons, brought an action against the City seeking a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Matrix Program. The plaintiffs argued that the program unfairly penalized homeless persons for engaging in life-sustaining activities.
The City argued the injunction should not be granted as no discrimination existed. They pointed out that the City and County offered more assistance to the homeless than nearly any other location in California. Further, Deputy Chief Thomas Petrini issued a department memorandum which stated that “the rights of the homeless must be preserved”.Samaha, 10th ed, 429. The memorandum included a bulletin on “Rights of the Homeless”. Finally, the City had, during the pendency of the program, conducted continuing education for officers regarding non-discriminatory enforcement of the program.

Holding
The plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction was denied by U.S. District Judge Lowell Jensen.

Analysis
The Court examined the arguments of the plaintiffs and City on the grounds of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. They noted that the assertion of denial of equal protection “requires proof that governmental action was undertaken with an intent to discriminate against a particular individual or class of individuals”. (ibid). The Court did not find that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient proof of such intent existed. Further, they found that the relief the plaintiffs sought was too vague to be enforceable. Finally, the Court found that because of said lack of evidence there was little chance of the plaintiffs ultimately prevailing against the City in a suit to permanently enjoin enforcement of the Matrix Program.

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Chapter 12 Crimes Against Public Order and Morals

Samaha Case Chapter 12 Crimes Against Public Order and Morals
Title: Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco
Citation: 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
Issue:
A motion to grant a preliminary injunction to stop the city of San Francisco form continuing its matrix Program. Is the Matrix program a singularly focused, punitive effort designed to move “an untidy problem out of sight and out of mind
Holding: Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.
Analysis:

In the present case, plaintiffs have not at this time demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the equal protection claim, since the City’s actions has not been taken with an evinced intent to discriminate against an identifiable group.
Conclusion:

The Court does not find that plaintiffs have made a showing at this time that constitutional barriers exist which preclude that effort Accordingly, the Court’s judgment at this stage of the litigation is to permit the City to continue enforcing those aspects of the Matrix Program now challenged by plaintiffs.
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Denial of equal protection requires proof that governmental action was undertaken with intent to discriminate against a particular individual or class of individuals. Such intent may be evinced by statutory language or in instances where a impact which cannot be explained on a neutral ground unmasks an invidious discrimination.
By Brad Dible

By Jay Wessel
Title: Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco
Citation: 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
Issue: Did the Matrix Program violate the due process law?
Holding: Preliminary injunction is denied
Analysis: Joyce filed a complaint against the city basically saying that him being homeless and living on the streets did not violate the Matrix Program
Conclusion: Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction is denied
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: San Franscio park code 3.12.- no person shall construct or maintain any building, structure, tent or any other thing in any park that may be used for housing accommodations or camping

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Crimes Against the State

Chapter 13
700 N. E. 2d 336 -—-
Chapter 13 Crimes Against the State
Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey
552 F. 3d 916, (C. A. 9 Cal. 2009)

Court examined the terms “training” (found it vague); “expert advice or assistance (found parts vague and parts not vague); “service” (found it vague); “personnel” (no longer vague – Congress’ fix worked.)
By: Jose Pena-Benjamin
Student Post Case Brief Here

Samaha Case Chapter 13 Crimes Against the State
Title: Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey
Citation: 552 F. 3d 916, (C. A. 9 Cal. 2009)
Issue:
Are the terms used training expert advide or assistance void for vagueness
Holding: Court examined the terms “training” (found it vague); “expert advice or assistance (found parts vague and parts not vague); “service” (found it vague); “personnel” (no longer vague – Congress’ fix worked)

Analysis:

Because IRTPA’s definition of “personal” provides fair notice of prohibited conduct to a person of ordinary intelligence and no longer punishes protected speech.
Conclusion:

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED
Principle
Doctrine
Rule of Law
Vague statutes are invalidated for three reasons: “(1) to avoid punishing people for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of laws based on arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement: by government officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.”
By Brad Dible
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Chapter 5 Defenses to Criminal Liability
by Savanna Short
Title: People v. Goetz
Citation: 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986)
Issue:Whether the grand jury instructions given by the prosecutor correctly stated N.Y. law.
Holding: The court ruled they did.
Conclusion:The Supreme Court, Appellate Division affirmed, and the People appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed, and reinstated all the counts of the indictment.
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law:Chapter 5: Defenses to Criminal Liability pg. 138 – Necessity, Proportionality, and Reasonable Belief
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Chapter 13 Crimes Against the State
By Jay Wessel
Title: Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey
Citation: 552 F. 3d 916, (C. A. 9 Cal. 2009)
Issue: Constitutionality of sections 302 and 303 of the act (AEDPA) and its 2004 amendment (the IRTPA). Does it violate their First and Fifth Amendment rights?
Holding: Affirmed
Analysis: The PKK and the LTTE want to train members on legal activities. The plaintiffs thought that the AEDPA violated their First and Fifth Amendment right, and that the term of providing “expert advice or assistance” to a designated foreign terrorist organization should be found unconstitutionally vague.
Conclusion: Affirmed, because there is no Fifth Amendment due process violation. Found that “training” is vague, “expert advice or assistance” is vague in parts, “service” is vague, and “personnel” is not vague.
Principle Doctrine Rule of Law: AEDPA section 2339B(a) – Specific Intent
AEDPA section 2339B, as amended by IRTPA – Training, Expert Advice or Assistance, Service, and Personnel are described in the IRTPA.

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Elements of Crimes

Burglary: breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a crime inside the building
Stupid: lacking in common sense or intelligence
Combine both and the following occurs.

-C. McLean

We did our video over Illegal Searches and Seizures. This is a huge problem in the Criminal Justice System today and is over-used by law enforcement. This relates to Criminal Law in many ways. It is a right as an American to have privacy and this is taken away when the police just storm in. Many times a case can be dismissed or the defendant acquitted for the reason of an illegal search and seizure. Lindsay, Jake, and Bryce

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Elements of Arson By: Becca, Autumn, and Whitney
State statutes do not categorize arsons in terms of motive while there's clearly differences between arson-for-profit, revenge arson, and pyromania. Some states reserve their harshest punishments for "arson with intent to defraud." Some states have the offense of "aggravated arson" which is similar to felony murder, but carries additional penalties if a firefighter gets injured while trying to put out the fire. A person helping with the crime is usually charged with arson rather than being an accomplice to the crime. Pouring gasoline on the floor of a building or possessing firebombs may be offenses related to arson under some state statutes. Arson involving damage to federal property is almost always prosecuted in federal court, as is anything (warehouses, truck facilities) involving interstate or foreign transport.

Explosives: Behavioral Aspects (taken from Criminal Profiling page)
By: Betsy Liebau, Lindsay Frahm, and Becca Theimer

• Introduction:
The use of fire and explosives is an extension of an offender’s will to use force. Fire and explosives are agents of an offender’s will. They injure or damage intended targets and victims and leave behind visible, recognizable patterns that can be interpreted by the nature and the extent of the resulting human damage, structural damage, and environmental damage (Turvey).
The term arson is a penal classification. Like the terms rape and homicide, it is used to refer to a certain constellation of criminal behavior. The type of behavior generally described the term arson is the intentional setting of a fire with the intent to damage or defraud (Turvey).

An accelerant is any fuel (solid, liquid, gas) that is used to initiate or increase the intensity or speed of the spread of fire. Once it has been established that an accelerant was used, it must further be determined whether or not the accelerant is native or foreign to the environment. The type of accelerant that the offender utilizes is dictated by experience, availability, motive, and intent (DeHaan, 1997, p. 415).

Some common accelerants include the following:
Gasoline Newspaper
Kerosene Accumulated Trash
Lighter Fluid Rags
Potable Liquors Clothing

The point of origin is a term used to refer to the specific location at which a fire is ignited or the specific location where a device is placed and subsequently detonated. Do not discount the possibility of multiple points of origin until all of the facts of the case are in. The point of origin is highly suggestive of the offender’s intended target and intended victim (Turvey).

• Method of Initiation
The way that an offender chooses to start, or delay, the burning of an accelerant or the detonation of a device depends on the types of fuels or explosives used, the amount of delay time that is desired, and the mobility of the target. Methods of initiation for fires, include but are not limited to the following (DeHaan (1997):
1. Open Flames (matches, lighters, and so on)
2. Fuses (any length of readily combustible material)
3. Smoldering materials
4. Cigarettes
5. Electrical arcs
6. Glowing wires
7. Chemical Reaction (commercial or improvised)
8. Black powder and flash powder

• Nature and Intent
When considering the nature and intent of any fire or explosive used by an offender, it is helpful to determine intentional versus actual damage. This means learning as much about the environmental structure and fuels in the point of origin as possible. This should be compared with the amount of accelerant or explosive used and the amount of damage incurred by the target. The more fuels or explosives the offender uses, the more damage the person intended to inflict on the target (Turvey).
Another important element to bear in mind when considering the nature and intent of any fire or explosive used by an offender is the targeting. By that it means to ask about the evidence regarding devices, initiation, and origin just what the fire or explosive was intended to inflict damage upon (Turvey).

• Motivational Aspects
Six major reasons to have proven to be helpful in identifying offender characteristics:
Revenge Profit
Excitement Crime concealment
Vandalism Extremism

• Precautionary-Oriented Fire Setting or Explosive Use
Precautionary-oriented fire setting or explosives use refers to the use of fire or explosives as a precautionary act- that is, when they are used to conceal, damage, or destroy any items or evidentiary value. This includes the partial or complete immolation of a crime scene or the victim (Turvey)

1. Conceal, Damage, or Destroy the Crime Scene
2. Setting a fire in an apartment after robbing it
3. Burning a shed to destroy blood evidence left behind from an abduction-homicide
4. Blowing up a residence with the victim inside, using the gas main, to conceal homicide

• Court Cases
1. Carolina v. Joseph Kelsey (1998)
2. Florida v. Ortiz (200)
3. Michigan v. Rossbach (2004)

References:
Turvey, Brent E. Criminal profiling an introduction to behavioral evidence analysis. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008.
Google Images
Arson Picture

By: Bronson Scott

By: Jessica Barker and Jasmine Gardner

CJ Student Digital Projects 2011

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next student post here

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Photo Gallery

CCC CJ Mock Incident 2008
Pic1- It is a picture of the detonation device that was wired to barrels of explosive material.
Pic2- Is a picture of the vehicle that was going to be used to blow up the theater.
Pic3- The suicide vest that Jackie was going to were when we blew up the building.
Pic4- The police vehicle that the cop that was shot was driving and some of the investigators collecting evidence.
Pic5- The investigators collecting more evidence.
Pic6- The investigators in the meeting room.
Pic7- The suspect getting thrown to the ground.
Dalton Simon and Rebecca Howard

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